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NOTE 
IIRIRA, SECTION 601(a): AN AMBIGUOUS, 
PROBLEMATIC, YET FOUNDATIONAL PROVISION FOR 
IMMIGRATION LAW—CAN IT BE FIXED? 
Caleb A. Sweazey†
ABSTRACT
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (the “IIRIRA”) provides a standard that defines unlawful human 
presence in the United States and establishes the consequences faced for 
such unlawful presence. Title VI, Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA (“Section 
601(a)”) grants asylum to people who have undergone a forced abortion or 
sterilization, or been threatened with the procedure, in their native country. 
Section 601(a) is problematic because it does not clearly identify how far, 
or even whether, the granting of asylum extends to relatives of the victim of 
a forced abortion or forced sterilization. Furthermore, Section 601(a) does 
not address the union of marriage; therefore, the section does not provide a 
definition or requirements for a victim’s partner to be considered a husband 
or spouse. Additionally, the lack of clarity in Section 601(a)(2) concerning 
the required Attorney General’s report for such grants of asylum is 
problematic. These deficiencies have caused immigration officials to apply 
Section 601(a) inconsistently and a split among the federal appellate 
circuits. This division and inconsistency undercuts the purpose of United 
States immigration, which is to provide specific standards to all judicial 
circuits and officials within the United States in order to bring about the 
consistent and equitable application of immigration law. 
This Note’s proposed solution to this division within jurisprudence is to 
adopt an amendment to Section 601(a). The amendment would clarify 
which relatives of a victim should be granted asylum and would 
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particularize the Attorney General’s required report even further. An 
amendment to Section 601(a) is the best solution to the problem, because 
even though the IIRIRA has not achieved a solution to all immigration 
problems, the Act has established foundational tenets on which to build, 
particularly in the area of asylum for victims of forced abortions and forced 
sterilizations. Asylum under the amendment to Section 601(a) would extend 
only to the legal husband and children of the victim of a forced abortion or 
forced sterilization. This requirement and specification concerning relatives 
would prevent falsification and fraud in the application process. Such an 
amendment also would require that the Attorney General’s report contain 
documented evidence that each approved applicant underwent a forced 
abortion or forced sterilization that was coercive, and it would establish 
criteria for required approval of asylum applications. These changes would 
clarify the confusion within jurisprudence concerning the application of 
Section 601(a) and would prevent ad hoc decision making by both the 
Attorney General and other officials in the determination and approval 
process concerning asylum applications. 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (the 
“IIRIRA” or “Act”) provided a critical component of immigration reform 
when it was signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 1996.1 The IIRIRA 
provides a standard that defines unlawful human presence in the United 
States; the Act also establishes the consequences faced by a person that is 
unlawfully present in the United States.2 However, the IIRIRA contains an 
unclear, and thus problematic, provision in Title VI, Section 601(a) of the 
Act (“Section 601(a)”).3 Section 601(a) grants asylum to people who have 
undergone a forced abortion or sterilization, or have been threatened with 
either procedure, in their native country.4
There are two major problems with Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA as it is 
written. First, Section 601(a) does not clearly identify how far, or even 
whether, the granting of asylum extends to relatives of the victim of a 
 1. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546 [hereinafter IIRIRA] (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)). 
 2. Id.
 3. IIRIRA § 601(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). 
 4. Id.
2010] IIRIRA, SECTION 601(a) 153 
forced abortion or forced sterilization (“victim”).5 Debate exists as to how 
closely related one must be to the victim in order to gain asylum under 
Section 601(a). This debate stems from the fact that Section 601(a) does not 
address the union of marriage.6 The lack of any definition or requirements 
for a victim’s partner to qualify as a husband or spouse opens up the 
possibility that any partner of a victim could gain asylum due to the 
victim’s experiences. This ambiguity extends to the debate as to which 
family members of a victim may gain asylum. Due to this lack of a 
standard, there has been an inconsistent application of Section 601(a) by 
immigration officials, as well as a circuit split among appellate courts.7 It is 
necessary to amend Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA to provide asylum to the 
immediate family members of a victim under the laws of the victim’s home 
country.8 These immediate family members shall only include the legal 
husband and the children of a victim, because non-spousal partners are 
often not readily and unmistakably identifiable under the laws of the 
victim’s home country.9
The second problem is the ineffectiveness concerning the requirement 
for a report from the Attorney General in Section 601(a)(2).10 For example, 
one potential problem created by Section 601(a)11 is the possibility that a 
foreign woman could undergo a voluntary abortion or sterilization and later 
claim that the procedure was coercive in the hope of gaining legal residence 
in the United States. Such a problem exists because Section 601(a)(2) only 
requires the Attorney General report to describe how many aliens have been 
admitted, to identify the aliens’ country of origin, and to estimate the 
numbers and origins of aliens that probably will gain asylum in the next 
two fiscal years.12 These minimal reporting requirements are not specific 
enough to ensure the investigation and prevention of the fraudulent scenario 
previously described. Each of these deficiencies creates confusion in the 
application of this important section of the IIRIRA, and thus undercuts the 
 5. Id.
 6. See infra text accompanying note 45. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part IV and proposed amendment to § 601(a) at text accompanying note 
183. 
 9. See infra Part IV and proposed amendment to § 601(a) at text accompanying note 
183. 
 10. See infra text accompanying note 45. 
 11. IIRIRA § 601(a). 
 12. See infra text accompanying note 45. 
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purpose of the entire Act.13 Therefore, the required Attorney General’s 
report must contain documented evidence that the abortion or sterilization 
was coercive.14
In addition to addressing the two ambiguities mentioned above, the 
amendment should require that a candidate for asylum provide evidence 
that she is not exempt from the forced family planning policies of her native 
country in any way.15 The goal behind the IIRIRA, and thus United States 
immigration policy, is and ought to be to provide specific standards that 
require the government, courts, and officials to grant asylum to certain 
oppressed individuals without unnecessarily providing the opportunity to 
foreign individuals to take advantage of the system. However, the 
ambiguities in the wording of the IIRIRA have undercut that goal, as seen 
in the confusion and disagreement in judicial application of the statute. 
This Note focuses on the current version of Section 601(a), the 
problematic effects that the section has had on the legal system, and 
proposes a solution to the problems of Section 601(a). The ambiguities in 
Section 601(a) have caused a split in authority among the circuits 
concerning whether asylum under the Section only extends to the husband 
of a victim who has suffered a forced abortion or forced sterilization, or 
rather not only to a husband but also to an unmarried partner of such a 
victim.16 Although the majority of circuits hold that asylum only extends to 
the husbands of victims, a growing minority of circuits have held that 
asylum also extends to the partners of victims.17 Additionally, some circuits 
have expressed doubt as to whether asylum should automatically extend to 
any relative of a victim at all.18 Therefore, this Note’s proposed solution to 
the division within IIRIRA jurisprudence is to adopt an amendment to 
Section 601(a) in order to clarify which relatives of a victim should be 
granted asylum and to particularize the requirements of the Attorney 
General’s report even further.19 An amendment to Section 601(a) is the best 
solution to the problem because, even though the IIRIRA has not achieved 
a solution to all immigration problems, it has established foundational 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part IV and proposed amendment to § 601(a) at text accompanying note 
183. 
 15. See infra Part IV and proposed amendment to § 601(a) at text accompanying note 
183. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part III.B.2.a. 
 18. See infra Part III.B.2.b. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
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tenets upon which to build, particularly in the area of asylum for victims of 
forced abortions and forced sterilizations.20 The proposed amendment to 
Section 601(a) would have three provisions: (1) it would only extend 
asylum to the legal husband and children of the victim of a forced abortion 
or forced sterilization; (2) it would require that the Attorney General’s 
report contain documented evidence that each approved applicant 
underwent a forced abortion or forced sterilization; and (3) it would 
establish criteria for required approval of asylum applications. 
II. BACKGROUND
A person who looks to the United States for asylum—for a safe 
place to live—must overcome significant barriers before such 
protection will be granted.21 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952 (the “INA”) is a foundational statute concerning asylum law, 
and was enacted prior to the IIRIRA.22 The INA requires that an 
asylum applicant establish a well-founded fear of persecution.23 In 
order for a fear of persecution to be well-founded, an applicant must 
demonstrate that he or she was persecuted on account of “race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”24 This requirement in the INA laid the foundation 
and provided a major reference point for the provisions in the 
IIRIRA, specifically in Section 601. Despite its lengthy statutory 
elements and requirements, the INA contained ambiguous language 
that gave substantial discretion to courts in determinations 
concerning asylum applications.25 Despite the identification of such 
terms as “persecution,” “well-founded fears,” and the five grounds 
that are protected from such persecution, the standards set forth in the 
INA lacked sufficient clarity. As a result, courts had to determine 
exactly what persecution means, identify the fears that are well-
founded, and recognize actions that qualify as persecution when 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009 [hereinafter INA] (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006)). 
 22. Id.
 23. Id.
 24. Id.; see Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 2007); see also In re
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 25. Andy Rottman, Comment, The Rocky Path from Section 601 of the IIRIRA to Issue-
Specific Asylum Legislation Protecting the Parents of FGM-Vulnerable Children, 80 U.
COLO. L. REV. 533, 542 (2009). 
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those actions were based on one of the five protected grounds.26
Because this ambiguity extends from the earlier INA to the latter 
IIRIRA, legislative clarity in this area is necessary to prevent judicial 
confusion, judicial standard-setting, and judicial activism. The next 
three sections will set out these ambiguities that started in the INA 
and continued through the enactment of the IIRIRA, to highlight the 
provisions ripe for legislation. 
A. IIRIRA Requirement #1: Persecution 
According to the INA, any application for asylum must involve the 
important element of persecution.27 Although the courts adhere to various 
definitions of persecution, the Ninth Circuit adequately defined persecution 
as “the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, 
religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive.”28 To be 
considered, any asylum applicant must therefore show that the alleged 
harm that he or she faces is persecution.29 Courts may artfully define 
persecution, but immigration officials must remember that such definitions 
are judicial constructions. Thus, courts are not limited to a statutory 
definition of persecution, but rather are free to define persecution as they 
see fit. This lack of a legislative standard allows courts and government 
officials to approve and deny asylum applications essentially at will. 
B. IIRIRA Requirement #2: Well Founded Fear of the Alleged Persecution 
In addition, even if the applicant meets this persecution standard, the 
applicant must also show a well-founded fear of the alleged persecution.30
This well-founded fear requirement contains subjective and objective 
components.31 The subjective component requires the asylum applicant 
actually experience a fear of persecution and such fear must be genuine.32
The objective component of the well-founded fear element requires that the 
 26. Id.
 27. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
 28. Ghaly v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995); 
see also Rottman, supra note 25, at 542. 
 29. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 30. Id.; see also Rottman, supra note 25, at 542. 
 31. Rodriguez-Rivera v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigration & Naturalization, 848 F.2d 998, 
1001 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 32. Id. at 1002. 
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applicant’s fears of persecution be reasonable.33 This objective component 
requires the applicant to show that there is a “‘clear probability’ . . . of 
persecution,” meaning that it is more likely than not that the applicant’s life 
or freedom is threatened.34 The Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) 
has held that to prove a well-founded fear of persecution, an applicant must 
prove that a “persecutor seeks to overcome [a belief] by means of 
punishment of some sort, [that] the persecutor is already aware, or could 
easily become aware” that the applicant holds that belief, and that the 
persecutor wants to punish holders of the belief and is capable of punishing 
holders of the belief.35 Like the definition of persecution, these 
requirements for a well-founded fear of persecution are problematic 
because they are not legislatively created and thus not generally applicable 
to all circuits.  
C. IIRIRA Requirement #3: Proper Reason for the Persecution Suffered 
Finally, the applicant bears the burden of proving that the persecution 
suffered, or the well-founded fear of persecution, was “on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”36 Generally, “this means that there must be some nexus between 
the persecution and the protected category.”37 On its face, this requirement 
does not provide asylum to victims of forced abortion or forced 
sterilization. Rather, this element of the asylum application requires a court 
to engage in a difficult analysis and determination of “the exact motive or 
motives for which harm has been inflicted.”38 In addition to the court, the 
Attorney General may grant asylum at his or her discretion.39 Further, even 
if the applicant meets all of the elements, the adjudicator may still find 
reason to deny the application for asylum.40 Although this does not usually 
occur, the power placed in the hands of adjudicators due to the lack of 
legislative direction and standards, illuminates the precarious position that 
 33. Id. at 1002. 
 34. Cardoza-Fonseca v. U.S. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 35. In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987). 
 36. INA § 101(a)(42) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)). 
 37. See Rottman, supra note 25, at 543.  
 38. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 492 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 39. In re A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 774, 780 (A.G. 2005) (decided by Attorney General 
Ashcroft). 
 40. Id. at 780. 
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asylum applicants occupy.41 As stated previously, these categories are 
ambiguous and flexible, and they give courts and the Attorney General too 
much freedom and too little concrete direction in granting asylum.42 Also, 
no provision exists to protect the victims of forced abortions or forced 
sterilizations, and therefore courts that analyze such provisions are not 
required to provide such protection. 
D. The IIRIRA Fills In the Gaps of the INA 
The IIRIRA43 was a response to both controversial case law and calls for 
statutory clarity concerning the legal requirements for foreigners seeking 
asylum in the United States. The Act sought to clarify the ambiguities and 
confusion in asylum law by restricting the overall availability of asylum 
and by expanding the protected category of political opinion, as seen in 
Section 601(a).44 According to Section 601(a) of the Act: 
 (1) . . . For purposes of determinations under this Act, a 
person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo 
involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure 
or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to 
a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have 
been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person 
who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to 
undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such 
failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.
 (2) Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, 
the Attorney General shall submit a report to the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the Senate describing the number and 
countries of origin of aliens granted refugee status or asylum
under determinations pursuant to the amendment made by 
paragraph (1). Each such report shall also contain projections 
regarding the number and countries of origin of aliens that are 
 41. See Rottman, supra note 25, at 543. 
 42. Id. at 542-43. 
 43. IIRIRA § 601(a). 
 44. Id.; see also Rottman, supra note 25, at 547-48. 
2010] IIRIRA, SECTION 601(a) 159 
likely to be granted refugee status or asylum for the subsequent 2 
fiscal years.45
Section 601(a) grants asylum to people who have undergone a forced 
abortion or sterilization, have been persecuted for refusing such a 
procedure, or have been threatened with the procedure in their native 
country.46 To gain asylum for threats or persecution, a victim-applicant 
must show a well-founded fear of persecution.47 Like the INA, Section 
601(a) of the IIRIRA contains the same ambiguous standards of “well-
founded fear” and “persecution,” as well as the protected ground of political 
opinion.48 Section 601(a) also gives a great amount of discretion to the 
Attorney General by failing to establish a detailed list of requirements for 
the Attorney General’s report.49 This failure allows the Attorney General to 
exercise personal discretion in granting or refusing asylum. Clearly, Section 
601(a) of the IIRIRA has many of the same problems and ambiguities of 
the INA.50
Despite Congress’ attempt to clarify the controversial area of asylum by 
passing the Act, IIRIRA Section 601(a) contains many ambiguities and has 
caused much judicial confusion.51 The ambiguities in Section 601(a) 
include a lack of direction as to which relatives of the victim qualify for 
asylum and what difficulties faced by an applicant qualify as persecution.52
The circuits have applied the IIRIRA in varying ways, which reflects the 
lack of clarity contained in the statute. Some circuits have held that the 
IIRIRA gives asylum to the spouses of the victims;53 other circuits have 
refused to follow this interpretation of the IIRIRA’s application to the 
relatives of victims. Although many of the following cases and subsequent 
statutes attempted to clarify the ambiguities, the confusion and lack of 
predictability in the area of asylum reflects the need for amendments to the 
IIRIRA that will help courts to apply the law to difficult and emotion-filled 
situations. The varying application of the IIRIRA by the circuits, the lack of 
standards for the Attorney General’s report and powers, and Section 
 45. IIRIRA § 601(a) (emphasis added). 
 46. Id.
 47. Id.
 48. Id.
 49. Id.
 50. See Rottman, supra note 25, at 544. 
 51. IIRIRA § 601(a); see infra Part III. 
 52. Rottman, supra note 25, at 548-49. 
 53. Id. at 552-53. 
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601(a)’s lack of a clear definition of a well-founded fear of persecution 
create problems that must be addressed, and this Note attempts to do it by 
proposing an amendment. 
III. PROBLEM: THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE IIRIRA’S
SHORTCOMINGS
The ambiguity of the definitions contained in Section 601(a) of the 
IIRIRA has caused many problems in the legal and social sphere. A circuit 
split currently exists concerning whether amnesty should be extended to 
both the husbands of victims and the boyfriends of victims, or only to the 
husbands of victims, under Section 601(a). Additionally, the lack of 
standards for the Attorney General’s report and decision-making powers 
threatens to give the Attorney General an extreme amount of discretion to 
decide whether applicants are awarded asylum. Finally, Section 601(a) 
lacks both a clear definition of and standards concerning what well-founded 
fear of persecution means. The current version of Section 601(a) of the 
IIRIRA is undercutting the Act’s goal to clarify asylum law.  
A.   The Controversy of In Re Chang That Preceded the IIRIRA 
In re Chang is a controversial case that preceded the IIRIRA and 
illuminated the need for statutory direction in the area of asylum law.54 In 
In re Chang, the asylum applicant, a husband and father of two children, 
feared the effect of the forced family planning policy in China on his wife 
and himself.55 According to the applicant, government officials told him 
and his wife to be sterilized after the birth of their second child.56 The BIA 
heard this case and denied asylum to the Chinese applicant who fled his 
home country’s coercive family planning system.57 The BIA reasoned that 
the asylum applicant had not established a sufficiently well-founded fear of 
persecution.58 The BIA’s ruling represented a judicial and administrative 
refusal to accept husbands fleeing China’s one-child policy unless the 
husband personally had experienced persecution.59 Section 601(a) of the 
IIRIRA attempted to overrule this case by providing that “a person who has 
a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a[n] 
 54. In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (B.I.A. 1989). 
 55. Id. at 39. 
 56. Id.
 57. Id. at 39, 47. 
 58. Id. at 47. 
 59. Id. at 42. 
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[abortive or sterilization] procedure or subject to persecution for such 
failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear 
of persecution on account of political opinion.”60 Although there was no 
explicit language establishing the eligibility for asylum of the husbands of 
victims, subsequent case law concerning this issue established that Section 
601(a) applied to the husbands of victims.61
Despite this provision in the IIRIRA, the statute did not identify how far, 
or even whether, the granting of asylum automatically extends to relatives 
of the victim who has undergone a forced abortion or sterilization, or been 
threatened with the procedure, in his or her native country. The statute also 
did not identify whether the granting of asylum extends to the unmarried 
partners of victims. Subsequent case law attempted to provide answers to 
these ambiguities. Although Section 601(a) attempted to nullify In re 
Chang’s denial of asylum to the husbands of victims, Section 601(a) was 
not clear enough to stand on its own as applicable to the husbands of 
victims and needed case law to determine its applicability. 
B.   The Effects of In re C-Y-Z-: Asylum to Husbands, but Not to Boyfriends 
In In re C-Y-Z-, which was decided after the IIRIRA became law, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals held that the grant of asylum provided by 
Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA broadly extended to the spouse of a victim.62
In this case, the asylum applicant and his spouse had three children before 
Chinese government officials forcibly sterilized the wife.63 American 
immigration officials denied the husband’s application for asylum, and the 
husband subsequently appealed this decision to the BIA.64 The BIA held 
that the spouses of victims of forcible sterilization or abortion qualified for 
asylum under IIRIRA Section 601(a) because the husband had shown that 
he underwent past persecution due to the persecution suffered by his wife.65
The Board also held that the only way that immigration officials can rebut a 
husband’s showing of past persecution is to show that the conditions or 
forced family planning programs in the applicant’s native country changed 
to such an extent that the applicant would not be in danger if he returned to 
 60. IIRIRA § 601(a) (emphasis added). 
 61. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 919-20 (B.I.A. 1997). 
 62. Id. at 919-20. 
 63. Id. at 915-16. 
 64. Id. at 915. 
 65. Id. at 918-19. 
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his native country.66 This holding meant that the spouse could stand in the 
shoes of the victim in an asylum application.67
Many criticized the Board’s decision for a supposed lack of reasoning, 
while others praised the decision as a case ensuring equal protection of the 
rights of men and women. Although this decision gave asylum to spouses 
of victims, the holding did not guarantee this right to the spouses of victims 
in the way that a specific amendment to Section 601(a) would. Seven 
circuits have deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of the IIRIRA in In re C-
Y-Z- in various subsequent decisions.68 In re C-Y-Z- established that asylum 
applied to the husbands of victims of abortions or sterilizations under 
Section 601(a), apparently solving the problem of the ambiguity of the 
statute.  
1. Cases That Have Followed or Deferred to the Holding of In re  
 C-Y-Z-
In re C-Y-Z- represents one side of the circuit split, and at least three 
circuits have directly followed its reasoning. Chen v. Ashcroft was an 
important case that effectively followed In re C-Y-Z- and used similar 
reasoning to those circuits that have followed or deferred to In re C-Y-Z-.69
In Chen v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit refused to grant asylum under Section 
601(a) to the partner of a victim because the partner was not the spouse of 
the victim under Chinese law.70 The court did not rule directly on In re C-
Y-Z- because it reasoned that the partners’ unmarried status caused the 
fiance to fall outside the scope of In re C-Y-Z-.71 The court also reasoned 
that a partner must be a legal spouse of the victim because the requirement 
of “objective documentary evidence”72 prevents falsification and fraud, 
unnecessary intrusion into the lives of the applicants, and that such a 
requirement did not subvert congressional intent.73 In Chen v. Ashcroft, the 
 66. Id. at 919. 
 67. Id. at 915. 
 68. Heidi Murphy, Sending the Men over First: Amending Section 601(A) of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act to Allow Asylum for Spouses and 
Partners, 33 VT. L. REV. 143, 155 (2008). 
 69. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 70. Id. at 233-35. 
 71. Id. at 227. 
 72. Id. at 228. 
 73. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993). The Supreme Court has stated that marital 
status is a sufficiently rational requirement, even when the requirement is over- or under-
inclusive. Id. 
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Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. that all courts are required to 
give significant deference to an agency’s interpretation of statutes when 
Congress has given administrative authority to that agency concerning the 
statute and the statutory language is ambiguous.74 According to this 
principle, courts are to give deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the 
IIRIRA because the BIA has administrative authority and the statutory 
language is ambiguous.75
Another case that closely followed the holding and reasoning of In re C-
Y-Z- is Lin-Jian v. Gonzales.76 In Lin-Jian, the Fourth Circuit granted 
review for an applicant named Lin whose wife had undergone a forced 
abortion.77 Lin claimed that his wife had undergone a forced abortion when 
she became pregnant after giving birth to a second child.78 The court held 
that an applicant may gain refugee status when the applicant’s spouse 
underwent a forced abortion, a forced sterilization, threats of either a forced 
abortion or sterilization, or had “a well-founded fear of being subjected to 
[a forced abortion or sterilization, or persecuted for resistance to] a coercive 
population control program.”79 The Fourth Circuit held that Lin was 
eligible for asylum if he could produce evidence that his wife underwent a 
forced abortion.80 The Fourth Circuit represents another appellate circuit 
that followed In re C-Y-Z-’s holding that Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA 
broadly extends asylum to the spouse of the victim.81
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit extended asylum to a male applicant in 
Huang v. Ashcroft in accordance with the holding in In re C-Y-Z-.82 In 
Huang, Chinese government officials forced the applicant’s wife to undergo 
not only an abortion but also sterilization when the couple became pregnant 
after having their first child.83 The court stated that either of these events 
 74. Chen, 381 F.3d at 232; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
 75. Chen, 381 F.3d at 232. 
 76. See Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 77. Id. at 193.  
 78. Id. at 185-86. 
 79. Id. at 188 (quoting Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 202 (4th Cir. 1999)).  
 80. Id. (citing In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997)). 
 81. Id.; see In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 919-20. 
 82. Huang v. Ashcroft, 113 F. App’x 695, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re C-Y-Z-, 
21 I. & N. Dec. at 915). 
 83. Id. at 697.  
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established past persecution of the applicant’s wife.84 The court recognized 
that a husband “stand[s] in his wife’s shoes” in an application for asylum.85
Like the Third and Fourth Circuits, the Sixth Circuit followed the reasoning 
of In re C-Y-Z- and extended eligibility for refugee status and asylum to 
spouses of victims of forced abortions and forced sterilizations.86
These three cases, Chen v. Ashcroft, Lin-Jian, and Huang, explicitly 
followed the reasoning behind In re C-Y-Z-, even though Chen v. Ashcroft 
did not directly rule on In re C-Y-Z-.87 In both Chen v. Ashcroft and Lin-
Jian, the court emphasized the importance and requirement that the asylum 
applicant produce documentation of legal marriage to the victim.88
Similarly, the court in Huang recognized that a legal husband gains the 
legal status of his wife concerning the result of an asylum application in the 
United States.89 Each court focused on the victim’s spousal relationship to 
the applicant in the review of both applications.90
Even without directly commenting on the accuracy of In re C-Y-Z-,
courts have also deferred to it in cases concerning asylum applications. This 
deference essentially achieves the same effect as explicitly following In re 
C-Y-Z-. However, the situation occurs when an appellate court does not 
comment on the validity of In re C-Y-Z-’s reasoning, but rather defers to the 
BIA’s interpretation of the seminal case in that particular circumstance. For 
example, in Zhang v. Ashcroft, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s denial 
of asylum to the boyfriend of the victim of a forced abortion in deference to 
In re C-Y-Z- because the boyfriend was not the victim’s husband.91 This 
court deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of the IIRIRA in In re C-Y-Z-
because the court merely identified and deferred to In re C-Y-Z- as
controlling precedent.92 The court in Zhang also adopted the Third Circuit’s 
analysis in Chen v. Ashcroft.93 The Fifth Circuit additionally noted that the 
impregnation of a girlfriend did not represent sufficient resistance to the 
 84. Id. at 700. 
 85. Id. at 698 (quoting In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997)). 
 86. Id. at 700. 
 87. Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182, 188 (4th Cir. 2007); Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 
221, 229-31 (3d Cir. 2004); Huang v. Ashcroft, 113 F. App’x 695, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(citing In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 915). 
 88. See supra text accompanying notes 72 and 80. 
 89. See supra text accompanying note 85. 
 90. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72, 80, and 84-85. 
 91. Zhang v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531-32 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 92. Id. at 532. 
 93. Id.
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forced family planning system of an applicant’s country.94 As with the 
previous circuits, the Fifth Circuit refused to grant asylum to the partner of 
a victim of abortion or sterilization without proof of a legal marriage under 
Chinese law.95
In another deferential case, Ge v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit held that an 
applicant “is automatically eligible for asylum if he can show that his wife 
was forced to undergo an abortion under China’s one-child policy.”96 In 
this case, a Chinese man applied for asylum on the claim that Chinese 
government authorities had forced his wife to undergo abortions.97 The 
Immigration Board rejected the application, and the applicant appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit.98 The Ninth Circuit overturned the Immigration Board’s 
rejection in this case.99 Although the Ninth Circuit directly referred to In re 
C-Y-Z- as the basis for its decision, the court remanded the case, instead of 
ruling according to In re C-Y-Z-, and granted the BIA discretion on whether 
to grant asylum.100 The Ninth Circuit accepted the applicant’s testimony as 
true; thus, the applicant should have been granted asylum.101 In this case, 
the Ninth Circuit apparently agreed with the other circuits that followed the 
literal holding of In re C-Y-Z-, but while the other circuits expressly treated 
the seminal case as good law, the Ninth Circuit instead used deferential 
language. Again, the effect of a deferential ruling concerning In re C-Y-Z-
is the same as implicitly or explicitly following the case, as was the case 
with Chen v. Ashcroft, Lin-Jiang, and Huang,102 except deference indicates 
recognition of a case as precedential, and not necessarily a complete 
agreement with the case. The Ninth Circuit’s refusal to apply In re C-Y-Z-
directly via an immediate reversal of the BIA’s denial of asylum 
exemplifies the line of cases that defer to In re C-Y-Z- without explicit 
comment on the case’s validity. 
The Ninth Circuit also applied the same deferential rationale the 
following year in Zheng v. Ashcroft. In Zheng, the court held that a married 
 94. Id.
 95. Id. 
 96. Ge v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2004).  
 97. Id. at 1122. 
 98. Id.
 99. Id. at 1127. 
 100. Id.
 101. Id.
 102. Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182, 188 (4th Cir. 2007); Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 
221-22, 227 (3d Cir. 2004); Huang v. Ashcroft, 113 F. App’x 695, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(citing In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 915). 
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asylum applicant had undergone past persecution because his wife had been 
forced to undergo an abortion.103 According to the court, a husband also 
establishes a rebuttable presumption of future persecution by showing that 
his native country’s policies forced his wife to undergo an abortion.104 This 
court focused on the importance of marriage in deciding whether a husband 
can establish past persecution based on his wife’s forced abortion.105
However, the court allowed the husband to establish past persecution, even 
though the couple had not been legally married under Chinese law.106 The 
court’s decision to extend recognition of past persecution to the husband of 
a victim indicated only partial deference to In re C-Y-Z-.107 However, the 
court’s recognition of past persecution and grant of a rebuttable 
presumption of future persecution to a partner that technically was not 
married under Chinese law indicates the need for an amendment to the 
IIRIRA that will clarify which partners of victims may gain asylum in the 
United States. The court’s referral to In re C-Y-Z- indicated deference, but it 
represented an incomplete following of the case as valid precedent; thus, 
the court refused to comment on the validity of In re C-Y-Z- as precedent 
and merely deferred to the seminal case. 
In another deferential case, Chen v. Gonzalez, the Seventh Circuit 
approved the BIA’s decision to deny asylum to a non-spousal applicant for 
asylum.108 In Chen v. Gonzales, the court reviewed a case where the BIA 
denied asylum to the boyfriend of a victim of a forced abortion, even 
though the boyfriend attempted to marry his girlfriend and was denied by 
Chinese officials based on marriage age limit laws.109 The court favorably 
recognized the number of circuits that deferred to the BIA’s decision in In 
re C-Y-Z-.110 After considering the boyfriend’s appeal, the Seventh Circuit 
ultimately denied the appeal, agreeing with previous rulings that gave broad 
deference to the BIA under the ruling of Chevron.111 This broad deference 
given to the BIA demonstrated that the Seventh Circuit joined the Third, 
 103. Zheng v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 104. Id. at 1148-49. 
 105. Id, at 1148. 
 106. Id.
 107. Id. at 1148-49. 
 108. Chen v. Gonzales, 152 F. App’x 528, 528 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 109. Id. at 529-30. 
 110. Id. at 530. 
 111. Id. at 531; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 865 (1984); see also supra text accompanying notes 74-75. 
2010] IIRIRA, SECTION 601(a) 167 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits’ agreements with the holding of In re C-Y-
Z-.
In contrast to the deferential line of cases lacking an opinion on In re C-
Y-Z-’s reasoning and validity as precedent, the Eighth Circuit explicitly 
recognized In re C-Y-Z- as good law in Cao v. Gonzales, and analyzed a 
male’s asylum application claim under that standard.112 The male applicant 
had a registered marriage license at the time of his application and claimed 
his wife underwent a forced abortion.113 However, the applicant claimed 
that he impregnated his wife five months before they obtained a legal 
marriage certificate, but after a customary marriage ceremony.114 The 
Eighth Circuit denied the application for asylum because of inconsistencies 
in the applicant’s testimony.115 The applicant claimed he and his wife 
received their official marriage registration when she was five months 
pregnant, but she said they received it at a later time; the court did not find 
these claims convincing.116 Although the court denied the husband’s 
application for asylum due to inconsistent tesitimony, the Eighth Circuit 
recognized In re C-Y-Z- as good law, which provided asylum to the 
husbands of victims of forced abortions and forced sterilizations in the 
absence of inconsistencies in testimony.117 Because IIRIRA Section 601(a) 
does not explicitly answer the question of whether a man whose wife has 
undergone a forced abortion or sterilization should be given asylum 
automatically, such a situation is left to the courts to decipher. Thus, an 
amendment to IIRIRA Section 601(a) would aid courts in applying the law 
to emotional situations such as this case. Although this case highlights the 
need for an amendment, it also identifies that the Eighth Circuit joins the 
ranks of the circuits that view In re C-Y-Z- as good law. 
Unlike Chen v. Ashcroft,118 Lin-Jian v. Gonzales,119 and Huang v. 
Ashcroft,120 the cases of Zhang v. Ashcroft,121 Ge v. Ashcroft,122 Zheng v. 
 112. Cao v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 113. Id. at 659. 
 114. Id. at 658-59. 
 115. Id. at 660. 
 116. Id.
 117. Id. at 660-61. 
 118. 381 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2004); see supra text accompanying notes 69-75. 
 119. 489 F.3d 182, 188 (4th Cir. 2007); see supra text accompanying notes 76-81. 
 120. 113 F. App’x 695, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 
915); see supra text accompanying notes 82-86. 
 121. 395 F.3d 531, 531-32 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 122. 367 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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Ashcroft,123 Chen v. Gonzalez,124 and Cao v. Gonzalez 125 have deferred to 
In re C-Y-Z- by holding that a male asylum’s application success is directly 
correlated to whether he is the legal husband of the victim of forced 
abortion or forced sterilization. As previously argued, mere deference to a 
case has the same effect as implicitly or explicitly following a case because 
the case’s holding is essentially unchanged. However, mere deference to a 
case may indicate that a court only acquiesces to a case’s holding because 
the court considers the case to be binding precedent. 
Despite the difference between implicitly or explicitly following a case’s 
holding and rationale, and merely deferring to a case’s holding via 
application of the law in ways avoiding comment on In re C-Y-Z-’s
reasoning and validity as precedent, each of these cases show that a 
majority of appellate courts have recently cited the holding in In re C-Y-Z
as good law.126 Therefore, these circuit courts collectively represent the 
side of the split that states that asylum extends only to the spouses of 
victims under Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA.127
2.   Cases That Have Indirectly or Directly Opposed In re C-Y-Z-
Indirect and direct opposition to the holding in In re C-Y-Z- exists, and is 
growing. Some circuits have opposed In re C-Y-Z- indirectly by holding 
that asylum under Section 601(a) extends to both the husbands and the 
boyfriends of victims of forced abortion and forced sterilization.128 Such 
holdings have the effect of broadening the application of In re C-Y-Z-.
Other circuits have directly opposed In re C-Y-Z- by holding that asylum 
under Section 601(a) does not automatically extend to either the husbands 
or boyfriends of victims of forced abortion and forced sterilization.129
These views represent a growing minority of circuits and illuminate the 
need for clarification to IIRIRA Section 601(a). 
a.   Indirect Opposition: The Broadening of In re C-Y-Z- 
Application 
In Ma v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit granted asylum under Section 601(a) 
of the IIRIRA to the partner of a victim, even though the partner was not 
 123. 397 F.3d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 124. 152 F. App’x 528, 528 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 125. 442 F.3d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 2006).  
 126. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 127. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 919-20 (B.I.A. 1997). 
 128. See infra Part III.B.2.a. 
 129. See infra Part III.B.2.b. 
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the spouse of the victim under Chinese law.130 Ma’s opposition to In re C-
Y-Z- only one year prior to Zheng’s deference to In re C-Y-Z- demonstrates 
a split within one appellate circuit.131 The court reasoned that the partner 
was not the spouse of the victim due to a Chinese law,  which established 
the age of marriage in order to enhance coercive family planning policies 
and reduce the reproductive time period for Chinese couples.132 In Ma, the
Ninth Circuit held that the court in In re C-Y-Z- and Congress intended to 
provide asylum to “‘couples’ persecuted on account of an ‘unauthorized’ 
pregnancy and to keep families together.”133 The court in Ma extended 
asylum to partners who did not have a legal marriage certificate from 
Chinese authorities.134 Therefore, this ruling effectively diverged from how 
the majority of circuits apply In re C-Y-Z-.  The court in In re C-Y-Z- did 
not specifically require a couple to be legally married under Chinese law in 
order for the husband to gain asylum. However, the court required the 
applicant to be the spouse of the victim.135 The holding in Ma diverges 
from the plain reading of In re C-Y-Z- and the majority of circuits in that it 
extends asylum to the partners of victims, even when the partner does not 
have a valid legal document of marriage under Chinese law. Ma’s holding  
supports the need for an amendment to section 601(a) of the IIRIRA,  
which will require the objective documentary evidence requirement 
identified in Chen v. Ashcroft. Such an amendment will prevent falsification 
and fraud in the application process for asylum.136
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit refused to consider In re C-Y-Z- in two 
separate opinions.137 In Zhang v. Gonzales, the court held that participants 
in traditional marriage ceremonies without legal documentation will qualify 
for the automatic grant of asylum to spouses of victims if one of the 
participants undergoes a forced abortion or forced sterilization.138 In Zhu v. 
Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit affirmed its application of the standard in 
 130. Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 661 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 131. Ma, 361 F.3d at 554, 561; see Zheng v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 132. Ma, 361 F.3d at 560-61. 
 133. Id. at 559 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-469(I), at 174 (1996)); see In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. 
& N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997). 
 134. Ma, 361 F.3d at 561. 
 135. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 919. 
 136. Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 137. Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 2006); Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 
993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 138. Zhang, 434 F.3d at 999. 
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Zhang.139 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ applications of the automatic 
grant of asylum to participants in traditional marriage ceremonies represent 
a judicial refusal to follow the plain reading of In re C-Y-Z- and  an 
expansion of the rule in In re C-Y-Z- according to the judicial opinion of 
Congressional intent behind the IIRIRA. 
b.   Direct Opposition: Eliminating In re C-Y-Z- Application 
In Lin v. United States, the Second Circuit held that the plain meaning of 
the language in Section 601(a) does not automatically extend asylum to 
either spouses or boyfriends of victims.140 The Second Circuit directly 
opposed the holding in In re-C-Y-Z, instead holding that the BIA’s 
interpretation of the IIRIRA’s automatic applicability to the spouses of 
victims was incorrect.141 Lin involved the asylum applications of several 
unmarried partners of victims of forced abortions, yet the Second Circuit 
did not rule solely on whether the IIRIRA gave asylum to non-spousal 
partners.142 Instead, the Second Circuit determined that the IIRIRA was not 
sufficiently ambiguous to force circuits to give Chevron deference143 to the 
BIA and held that the IIRIRA did not extend automatic asylum to the 
spouse of a victim of a forced abortion or a forced sterilization.144 In order 
to obtain asylum, an applicant has to show he or she had personally
“undergone or been threatened with coercive birth control procedures.”145
Despite the ambiguities of Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA that required 
Chevron deference to the BIA’s holding, the Second Circuit held contrary 
to the holding in In re C-Y-Z-.146 Similar holdings amongst many circuits 
show confusion concerning the law and its application and support the 
contention of this note for an amendment to IIRIRA Section 601(a). The 
First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits have also followed such a direct 
rejection of In re C-Y-Z-.147 In particular, the Third Circuit’s rejection of In
re C-Y-Z-’s holding in Lin-Zheng contradicts its previous position in Chen 
 139. Zhu, 465 F.3d at 321. 
 140. Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 309 (2d Cir. 2007).   
 141. Id. at 299. 
 142. Id. at 299-300.
 143. Id. at 300; see supra text accompanying notes 74-75. 
 144. Lin, 494 F.3d at 299; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 145. Lin, 494 F.3d at 314. 
 146. Id. at 299-300, 314. 
 147. See Dong v. Holder, 587 F.3d 8 (1st. Cir. 2009); Lin-Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 557 
F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2009); Yu v. U.S. Att’y Gen, 568 F.3d 1328, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 
2009); Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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v. Ashcroft.148 Despite the Third Circuit’s rejection of In re C-Y-Z-, it did 
not overrule Chen v. Ashcroft completely because Chen v. Ashcroft did not 
rule on In re C-Y-Z- directly.149 The First, Second, Third, Seventh, and 
Eleventh Circuits’ decisions indicate a growing trend in the circuits to reject 
the reasoning in In re C-Y-Z- and to reason that the IIRIRA is not 
sufficiently ambiguous to give deference to the BIA’s decisions concerning 
the IIRIRA. At the very least, these three circuits’ decisions represent a 
significant minority opinion that refuses to grant asylum to a spouse unless 
that spouse has personally undergone or been threatened with coercive birth 
control procedures. This shows the need for a clarifying amendment to 
Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA. 
3.   Summary of the Judicial Treatment of In re C-Y-Z-
In summary, a large quantity of case law exists concerning In re C-Y-Z-,
and circuits are sharply divided on the ruling’s validity. Seven circuits have 
either affirmed or deferred to the judgment in In re C-Y-Z-.150 This majority 
reasons that asylum should extend only to the legally married husbands of 
the victims of forced abortions and forced sterilizations because this 
prevents fraud and keeps legal families together.151 However, a growing 
minority of circuits either hold that asylum should extend to victims’ legal 
spouses and partners,152 or that Section 601(a) does not automatically
extend asylum to either the spouses or partners of those victims.153 The fact 
that the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have essentially either ruled 
 148. Lin-Zheng, 557 F.3d at 148-49, 153 n.7; Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
 149. Chen, 381 F.3d  at 227.  
 150. Id. at 227-28 (following In re C-Y-Z-); see Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (following In re C-Y-Z-); Cao v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(deferring to In re C-Y-Z-); Chen v. Gonzales, 152 F. App’x 528 (7th Cir. 2005) (deferring 
to In re C-Y-Z-); Zhang v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531, 532 (5th Cir. 2004) (deferring to In re C-
Y-Z-); Huang v. Ashcroft, 113 F. App’x 695, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2004) (following In re C-Y-
Z-); Ge v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2004) (deferring to In re C-Y-Z-).  
 151. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73. 
 152. Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006) (affording protection to 
spouses in cases “[w]here a traditional marriage ceremony has taken place, but is not 
recognized by the Chinese government because of the age restrictions in the population 
control measures”); Zhu, 465 F.3d at 321 (citing approvingly to the traditional marriage 
ceremony standard elicited in Zhang, even though the asylum applicant had not even been 
involved in such a ceremony); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004) (extending 
asylum to unmarried couples).  
 153. See Lin-Zheng, 557 F.3d 147; Yu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 
2009); Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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dichotomously or switched sides further indicates the confusion in this area 
of the law.154 The mass of conflicting case law supports the need for either 
an amendment to Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA or a Supreme Court 
decision that clarifies the issue. The most effective method to ensure that all 
courts have clear and unambiguous legislative language to apply to 
applications for asylum would be an amendment to Section 601(a). 
C.   Statutory Provisions Show Recognition of the Problems with Section 
601(a) 
In addition to the circuit split concerning the application of Section 
601(a), legislative action shows the existence of recognition among 
legislators that the current version of the IIRIRA contains ambiguous 
provisions, and is thus insufficient. The original version of Section 601 of 
the IIRIRA limited how many foreigners could gain asylum in the United 
States to 1000.155 Congress has recently passed the REAL ID Act, which 
removed the numerical limitation on the admittance of refugees contained 
in Section 601(b) of the IIRIRA.156 Although this removal of the numerical 
limitation of Section 601(b) allows more victims of persecution to find 
protection in the United States, the removal of the limitation also increases 
the possibility of laxity on the part of immigration officials. Unlimited 
admittance removes the catalyst for meticulous consideration in the 
determination of the applicants best qualified for asylum that a limitation on 
admittance provides. The removal of the numerical limitation enhances the 
importance of the Attorney General’s report required by Section 
601(a)(2),157 further identifying the need for an amendment setting stricter 
standards and requirements for the Attorney General’s report in order to 
prevent fraudulent applications. 
D.   Additional Cases That Show the Need for an Amendment to the IIRIRA 
Finally, a disagreement exists concerning the meaning of a well-founded 
fear of persecution within the application of Section 601. As opposed to the 
previously cited cases, where there was disagreement as to whether asylum 
extended to certain members of the family, this disagreement concerns what 
constitutes a well-founded fear of forced sterilization or abortion.158 In Li v. 
 154. See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
 155. IIRIRA § 601(b). 
 156. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §101, 119 Stat. 231, 304-05 (2005). 
 157. See IIRIRA § 601(a)(2); supra text accompanying note 45. 
 158. See supra Part III.B. 
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Gonzales, the Third Circuit rejected a Chinese woman’s asylum application 
claim of a well-founded fear of persecution based upon coercive family 
planning procedures performed on other people.159 The woman claimed 
that her fear of a forced abortion or forced sterilization due to the coerced 
experiences of her mother, sister, and aunt was well-founded.160 The court 
reasoned that the woman could not stand in the shoes of her mother, aunt, 
or sister, just as a fiancé could not stand in the shoes of his non-spousal 
partner; therefore, the court’s reasoning affirms the rationale in In re         
C-Y-Z-, even though it is applied to a different set of circumstances.161 Li v. 
Gonzalez identifies both the lack of a clear definition of a well-founded fear 
in Section 601(a), and the need for an amendment that specifies that only 
spouses can stand in the shoes of their partner with regard to that well-
founded fear of persecution. 
An amendment to Section 601 of the IIRIRA must also specify which 
relatives of a victim may claim asylum. In Xue Yun Zhang v. Gonzales, the 
Ninth Circuit rejected the application for asylum of a child whose mother 
underwent a forced abortion, affording deference to the BIA’s denial of the 
application.162 The court cited Chevron in its deference to an agency’s 
decision concerning an ambiguous statute.163 The court held that the child 
of a victim of forced abortion or forced sterilization is not automatically 
eligible for asylum.164 In Yuan v. United States, the Second Circuit denied 
automatic asylum to the parents and in-laws of victims of forced abortions 
and forced sterilizations.165 The court reasoned that the purpose of Section 
601(a) was to protect the actual victims of forced abortions and forced 
sterilizations, not the parents of the victims.166 The effect of these cases is 
that a victim’s flight from persecution results in a fractured and separated 
family. This result mandates that Section 601 must include a provision that 
specifies which relatives of victims of persecutions should qualify for 
asylum. 
 159. Li v. Gonzales, 151 Fed. App’x 137, 138 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 160. Id. at 138, 140. 
 161. Id. at 140. 
 162. Xue Yun Zhang v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1239, 1246, 1250 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 163. Id. at 1246; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 164. Xue Yun Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1250. 
 165. Yuan v. United States, 416 F.3d 192, 194 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 166. Id. at 197. 
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IV. SOLUTION
Since the goal behind the IIRIRA should be to provide specific standards 
that require the government, courts, and officials to grant amnesty to certain 
oppressed individuals without unnecessarily providing the opportunity to 
foreign individuals to take advantage of the system, Section 601(a) must 
effectuate such a result.167 However, as seen with the split in case law,168
this section of the Act does not accomplish the IIRIRA’s goal and thus 
undercuts an effective immigration policy for the United States.169 The 
cases and statutes identified supra Part III reflect the confused application 
of IIRIRA Section 601(a), as well as the ambiguity of this key piece of 
legislation concerning disadvantaged individuals.170 Despite the 
ambiguities in IIRIRA Section 601(a), it is not past saving.171 Its attempt to 
provide a solution to immigration problems has, at a minimum, established 
foundational tenets on which to build. Therefore, an entirely new bill would 
be an unnecessary waste of the valuable efforts that went into the drafting 
of the IIRIRA, including Section 601(a).172
The disagreements and varying interpretations of Section 601(a) among 
the judicial circuits prove that judicial changes cannot be trusted to repair, 
or to clarify the ambiguities. Thus, an amendment to Section 601(a) would 
be the most efficient solution.173 This Note will provide a sample 
amendment to Section 601(a) that would solve the problems previously 
identified. 
Importantly, the legislation and its subsequent application affect not only 
foreign individuals, but also the integrity of United States governance. 
Section 601(a) does not clearly identify whether the granting of asylum 
extends to relatives of the victim.174 Because Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA 
does not address the union of marriage, it does not provide requirements for 
a victim’s partner to be considered a husband or spouse. A majority of 
circuits have held that the spouse of a victim of a forced abortion or a 
forced sterilization is automatically eligible for asylum, which is in 
 167. IIRIRA § 601(a). 
 168. See supra Part III. 
 169. IIRIRA § 601(a). 
 170. Id.
171. Id.
 172. Id.
 173. Id. 
 174. Id.
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accordance with In re C-Y-Z-.175 However, a growing minority of circuits 
has held that the standard of In re C-Y-Z- does not apply, and that the BIA’s 
interpretation of the IIRIRA’s automatic applicability to the spouses of 
victims is incorrect.176 Even some circuits, purporting to follow In re C-Y-
Z-, recognize partners that do not have a legal marriage certificate, but 
rather participated in a traditional marriage ceremony without legal 
documentation.177 Section 601(a) provides little guidance and few 
requirements for the mandated Attorney General’s report.178 Section 601(a) 
of the IIRIRA must be amended to remedy its ambiguities and 
shortcomings and provide guidelines for the BIA and appellate circuits to 
follow. 
The necessary solution to the problems identified supra Part III is to 
amend Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA to provide asylum to the immediate 
family members of a victim under the laws of the victim’s home country. 
These immediate family members should only include the legal husband 
and the children of a victim because non-spousal partners are often not 
readily, and unmistakably, identifiable under the laws of the victim’s home 
country. Additionally, only marriages that are recognized by the laws of the 
applicant’s home country should be valid. According to the Third Circuit in 
Chen v. Ashcroft, this requirement would prevent falsification and fraud.179
Therefore, a husband applying for asylum under Section 601(a) of the 
IIRIRA must produce legal documentation of marriage to a woman who has 
been forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization, or has a well-founded 
fear of a forced abortion or forced sterilization. An exception should be 
made for members of religious, political, racial, and ethnic groups that are 
prevented from legally marrying in their native country based on their 
religion, race, political ideology, and ethnicity. 
Moreover, Section 601(a) must be amended to require that the Attorney 
General’s report contain documented evidence that each approved applicant 
underwent a forced abortion or forced sterilization that was coercive. 
Section 601(a) should be amended to establish acceptance criteria for 
asylum; if an individual underwent a forced abortion or forced sterilization, 
or the individual’s legal spouse underwent such treatment, and there are no 
legal inconsistencies or falsifications in the documents or testimony 
 175. See supra Part III.B.1; In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997). 
 176. See supra Part III.B.2.b. 
 177. See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
 178. IIRIRA § 601(a)(2). 
 179. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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presented, then the application may not be denied. This will prevent ad hoc 
decision making on the part of the Attorney General.  
Additionally, Section 601(a) must be amended to include the following 
legislative definition of a well-founded fear of persecution: an applicant 
must prove that a “persecutor seeks to overcome” a belief “by means of 
punishment of some sort,” that “the persecutor is already aware, or could 
easily become aware” that the applicant holds that belief, and that the 
persecutor wants to punish holders of the belief and is capable of punishing 
holders of the belief. Each court will be required by the amendment to 
follow this definition of a well-founded fear of persecution in order to avoid 
inconsistency. 
Finally, a candidate for asylum must not be exempt from the forced 
family planning policies of her native country, in any way, other than 
infertility caused by past persecution. Section 601(a) should be amended to 
include a provision that a woman may not obtain asylum under the IIRIRA 
if she is exempt from the forced family planning policies of her native 
country, in any way, other than infertility caused by past persecution. A 
personal exemption from the forced family planning policies of a woman’s 
native country would mean that the woman could not have a well-founded 
fear of persecution.  
The proposed amendment is the best solution to the problems existing in 
this area of jurisprudence. If the statute is the foundation that cases are built 
upon, an amendment rebuilds the inadequate foundation instead of 
continually attempting to repair the faulty building above it. The IIRIRA, 
particularly Section 601(a), has failed since its inception due to faulty 
drafting that lacked the specifics to enable efficient and consistent 
application by officials and courts.180 Courts have attempted to define, 
redefine, and follow a rule that gives little direction; such a cycle leads only 
to disaster, does not serve justice, and does not protect the United States.181
Therefore, any amendment must include the stated requirements in element 
form; each official involved in an asylum application must follow the 
elements; and any court involved must apply the elements.  
Keeping in mind the actual text of Section 601(a)182 as quoted above, the 
following is an Amendment that would solve the ambiguities of Section 
601(a): 
 180. IIRIRA § 601(a); see supra Part III. 
 181. See supra Part III. 
 182. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who has 
been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary 
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to 
undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive 
population control program, shall be deemed to be a “victim” for 
the purposes of this Act and to have been persecuted on account 
of political opinion. Such a victim shall qualify for asylum under 
the provisions of this Act and all other applicable immigration 
laws of the United States of America.  
Additionally, a person who has a well-founded fear that he or she 
will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to 
persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be 
deemed to be a “victim” for the purposes of this Act, to have a 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion, 
and shall qualify for asylum under the provisions of this Act and 
all other applicable immigration laws of the United States of 
America. For the purposes of this Act, in order to prove that he 
or she has suffered a well-founded fear of persecution, an 
applicant must prove that: 
 a. a persecutor seeks to overcome a belief by means of 
punishment or other force of some sort,  
 b. that the persecutor is already aware, or could easily 
become aware that the applicant holds that belief, and  
 c. that the persecutor wants to punish holders of the belief 
and is capable of punishing holders of the belief.  
Each court shall follow this definition of a well-founded fear of 
persecution. For the purposes of this Act, the refusal to undergo 
an abortion or sterilization constitutes a belief that such action is 
impermissible. 
A female applicant may not obtain asylum under this section if 
she is exempt from the forced family planning policies of her 
native country, in any way, other than infertility caused by past 
persecution. 
Asylum shall only be provided under this section of the Act to the 
immediate family members of a victim under the laws of the 
victim’s home country. These immediate family members shall 
only include the legal husband and the children of a victim. Only 
marriages that are recognized by the laws of the applicant’s 
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home country shall be valid. In order for a husband of a victim 
to qualify for asylum, the husband must produce valid 
documentation of marriage to a woman who has been forced to 
undergo an abortion or sterilization, or has a well-founded fear 
of a forced abortion or forced sterilization. However, members 
of religious, political, racial, and ethnic groups that are 
prevented from legally marrying in their native country based on 
their religion, race, political ideology, and ethnicity shall not 
have to produce such documentation, but rather must produce 
sufficient evidence of an attempt to marry and an official 
rejection on the basis of that husband’s membership in one of 
those groups. 
Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, the 
Attorney General shall submit a report to the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the Senate describing the number and countries 
of origin of aliens granted refugee status or asylum under 
determinations pursuant to the amendment made by paragraph 
(1). This report must contain documented evidence that each 
approved applicant underwent a forced abortion or forced 
sterilization that was coercive. If an applicant personally 
underwent a forced abortion or forced sterilization, or the 
individual’s legal spouse underwent such treatment, and there 
are no legal inconsistencies or falsifications in the documents or 
testimony presented, then the application shall not be denied.
Each such report shall also contain projections regarding the 
number and countries of origin of aliens that are likely to be 
granted refugee status or asylum for the subsequent 2 fiscal 
years.183
This amendment to Section 601(a) addresses and solves multiple 
problems that the ambiguities in the existing section have caused.184 The 
proposal identifies which individuals would be able to claim status as a 
victim. The amendment also clarifies what constitutes a well-founded fear 
of persecution. “A well founded fear of persecution” is a phrase that is 
continually used in case law,185 but has not been clearly defined in Section 
 183. See supra text accompanying note 45 (additions to the original section are in italics). 
 184. IIRIRA § 601(a); see supra Part III. 
 185. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
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601(a) in a way that includes persecution on the basis of a victim’s 
beliefs.186 Additionally, the proposed amendment establishes clear 
parameters for the Attorney General’s report concerning grants of 
asylum.187 Most importantly, the amendment identifies which family 
members of a “victim” qualify for asylum, leaving no room for 
disagreement in the application of Section 601(a) in immigration law and 
the appellate circuits.188
V. CONCLUSION
Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA fails to effectuate the goal of United States 
immigration, which is to provide specific standards for application of 
immigration law by all judicial circuits and officials within the United 
States.189 An increasingly slim majority of circuits tenuously holds to the 
questionably reasoned In re C-Y-Z- as a basis for the sole provision of 
asylum to the legal spouse of a victim of forced abortion or forced 
sterilization.190 Some circuits interpret In re C-Y-Z- as extending asylum to 
both partners and legal spouses of victims, although this seems to stretch 
beyond a facial application of the case’s holding.191 Still other circuits 
refuse to follow In re C-Y-Z-, and subsequent statutes have tweaked some 
requirements in Section 601(a), furthering the confusion.192
 In light of this confusion and disagreement, Section 601(a) of the 
IIRIRA must be amended to provide that only legal spouses of victims, and 
the victim’s children, of forced abortion and forced sterilization can gain 
automatic asylum under the statute.193 Such a provision is not a value 
judgment, but rather one of practicality. Justice Alito’s reasoning in Chen v. 
Ashcroft holds true today: the “objective documentary evidence” that a 
legal spouse can produce prevents falsification, fraud, and unnecessary 
intrusion into the lives of the applicants during and after the application 
process.194 Therefore, an amendment to Section 601(a) of the IIRIRA must 
provide asylum to the legal spouse of a victim and to the children of the 
 186. See supra text accompanying note 45; see also IIRIRA § 601(a). 
 187. See supra proposed amendment to § 601(a) at text accompanying note 183. 
 188. See supra Part III. 
 189. See supra Parts III and IV. 
 190. See supra Part III. 
 191. See supra Part III. 
 192. See supra Part III. 
 193. See supra proposed amendment to § 601(a) at text accompanying note 183. 
 194. Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2004).  
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victim, require that the Attorney General’s report contain documented 
evidence that each approved applicant underwent a forced abortion or 
forced sterilization that was coercive, include a proper legislative and not a 
judicial definition of a well-founded fear of persecution, and ensure that an 
applicant for asylum is not exempt from the forced family planning policies 
of her native country.195
 195. See supra Part IV proposed amendment to § 601(a) at text accompanying note 183. 
